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HOW BIASED IS THE BEHAVIOR OF THE 





In spite of the success that warrants have had in some financial markets, little is 
known regarding the profile of those most likely to invest in this complex financial 
instrument. This paper looks to define the profile of the investor in warrants and 
searches for non-rational motives that may explain the success of the market for 
warrants among individual investors. Based on the actual trading behavior of individual 
investors in the Portuguese financial market during almost ten years, I examine the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the investors in warrants and discuss the 
hypothesis that some behavioral biases influence the individual investors’ 
predisposition to invest and trade in warrants. More precisely, I empirically examine 
the hypotheses that overconfidence, the disposition effect and the pleasure of 
gambling have an impact on the participation and trading in warrants, controlling for 
investors’ socio-demographic characteristics. Moreover, I search for profile and 
behavioral biases differences between investors that trade intensely in warrants and 
investors that only trade less frequently. 
Overconfidence is probably the most widely studied and well-established 
behavioral bias. Generally defined as people’s tendency to overestimate their 
knowledge, abilities and the precision of their information, as well as their capacity to 
estimate and control future events, overconfidence has been defined in different 
dimensions: miscalibration (cf. Lichtenstein et al. 1982, Fischhoff et al. 1977 or Daniel 
et al. 1998), better-than-average effect or illusion of control (Thompson, 1999). 
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Those different dimensions of overconfidence are interconnected. For example, 
people who are overconfident about their abilities tend to overestimate their influence 
over outcomes. For that reason, one could argue that overconfidence is best 
apprehended by its consequences. The most widely recognized consequence of 
overconfidence is that it induces higher trading volume. Overconfident investors, either 
because they overestimate the precision of the information they have, or because they 
think they have above average investment skills, trade more than rational investors. 
For De Bondt and Thaler (1995) overconfidence is the key behavioral factor needed 
to understand the overtrading puzzle. Odean (1998b) argues that the high level of 
trading volume is the most important effect of overconfidence. Statman et al. (2006) 
presents empirical evidence for the US market and argues that trading volume is 
particularly higher after high returns, as investment success increases the degree of 
overconfidence.  
However, the different dimensions of overconfidence do not measure the same 
thing and research shows that they do not induce the same errors in the financial 
behavior of individual investors. Investor’s unrealistic tendency to believe that their 
abilities, knowledge and overall capacity to analyze available information are better 
than average may have a particular impact on trading behavior, particularly for 
investors with high past performance.  
 The intuition behind this argument is that the accumulation of successful 
market investments makes investors increasingly overconfident and consequently 
makes them trade more. Due to a self-attribution bias, investors think they are above 
average regarding their investment skills. This better than average effect has been 
documented empirically by Glaser and Weber (2007) who provide evidence of a higher 
trading propensity by overconfident investors when they identify overconfident 
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investors as those who think they are better than average in terms of investment skills 
or past performance. This finding is also consistent with other studies (see Deaves et 
al. 2009, Graham et al. 2009).  
The disposition effect is another important bias in finance, because it is costly. In 
fact, investors who show this bias usually hold poorly diversified portfolios and end up 
making bad financial decisions that are contrary to rational models of investment. 
Labeled by Shefrin and Statman (1984), the disposition effect describes the tendency 
that investors have to sell securities whose price is rising, the so-called winners, while 
keeping in portfolio securities whose price is declining, the losers. 
Three rational motives may justify the disposition effect: portfolio rebalancing, 
trading costs, and tax-related motives for selling stocks at a loss. However, Odean 
(1998a) finds disposition effect even after controlling for portfolio rebalancing and 
trading costs, and Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) considers that the disposition effect 
dominates tax-related motives for selling stocks at a loss. Several other empirical 
papers have also documented the existence of disposition effect (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju 2001, Shapira and Venezia 2001, Dhar and Zhu 2002). 
Much of the behavioral finance literature relates the disposition effect to loss 
aversion. Investors value a title gain or loss relatively to a reference point, usually the 
purchase price of the asset. When transactions are carried in the financial market, 
agents will evaluate their portfolio and whether the assets have appreciated or 
depreciated vis-a-vis the purchase price. Combining the analysis of the reference point 
with the fact that investors are risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seekers in 
the domain of losses, it is easy to understand that if the asset price falls and remains 
below the reference point, investors, who value losses more than gains, will be averse 
to sell that asset for a loss, causing a reduction in the supply of potential sellers. A 
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losing stock would be considered a loss and being risk-seeker in this domain would 
cause the investor to hold the stock. However, other behavioral finance justifications 
have been added to explain the disposition effect. Barberis and Xiong (2009) 
concludes that the investors’ tendency for selling winning stocks too early and holding 
losing stocks too long depends on the success of past investments. If past investments 
where set at a gain, the agents will be progressively less risk averse and will show 
more disposition effect. Muermann and Volkman (2006) focuses on how anticipating 
regret and pride in a dynamic setting may cause investors to optimally follow a strategy 
in which they sell winning stocks and hold losing stocks; that is, on how anticipating 
regret and pride contribute to explain the disposition effect. Summers and Duxbury 
(2012) favors emotion over prospect theory to explain the disposition effect.  
The pleasure of gambling is also important to understand individual investors’ 
behavior. It refers to the classical hedonic motivational principle that people approach 
pleasure and avoid pain. This pleasure-seeking motivation should be considered in a 
wide context, associated with other types of positive emotions (Proyer 2017 mentions 
interest or contentment). Some people trade in financial markets only because trading 
brings the joy of gambling. Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) examines the hypothesis 
that entertainment motives drive trading by combining survey responses and 
transaction records for a sample of more than 1,000 clients at one discount broker in 
Germany. The authors conclude that although investors do not only trade for 
entertainment purposes, clients classified as potentially entertainment-driven trade 
more than their peers. In addition, entertainment-driven investors turn over their 
portfolio of stocks, bonds, funds and options at roughly twice the rate of their peers. In 
the same line of reasoning some authors argue that investors who are more prone to 
sensation seeking trade more frequently. According to Zuckerman (1994), “sensation 
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seeking is a trait defined by the seeking of varied, novel, complex, and intense 
sensations and experiences, and the willingness to take financial risks for the sake of 
such experience.”2 As Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) puts it, for investors prone to 
sensation seeking ‘‘the mere act of trading and the monitoring of a constant flow of 
‘fresh stocks’ in one’s portfolio may create a more varied and novel experience than a 
buy and hold strategy”.3  
 
This study adds to the existing literature on derivative products in some important 
aspects. Firstly, I analyze the relative importance of overconfidence, disposition and 
gambling as drivers for the individual investment and trading in warrants (a complex 
financial product), comparing to the investment and trading in stocks. Secondly, as far 
as I know this is the first study that analyzes whether investors who invest and trade 
more frequently have a different profile than other investors who trade less frequently. 
Lastly, unlike most empirical studies the design of this research combines actual 
trading behavior of retail investors with a survey of these investors conducted by a 
securities regulator (the Portuguese securities commission).  
I start out documenting that investors in warrants are indeed different, not only 
because they have specific socio-demographic characteristics but they also reveal 
specific behavioral biases. Overconfident investors and investors who exhibit a 
disposition or a gambling attitude are more likely to invest in warrants. Next, investor’s 
trading activity is studied and the hypothesis that investors in warrants trade differently 
than investors in stocks is tested. Results show that warrants trading activity increases 
with overconfidence, disposition and gambling. The warrants’ market differs from de 
                                                          
2 Cf. Zuckerman (1994), p.27. 
3 Cf. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009), p.556. 
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stock market in the sense that the search for pleasure seems to increase warrants 
transactions but decreases stock trading activity. In other words, when investors are 
driven to trade in financial markets for pleasure they tend to trade complex products 
more and to trade simple and easier to understand financial instruments less. Finally, 
I control for the time span in which the investor is active in the market, splitting 
investors according to their intensity of trading. I find that disposition and gambler’s 
effects are more relevant to explain the frequency of trading the higher the intensity, 
but they are of no help to understand the top quantile traders. High trading frequency 
investors seem to be more heterogeneous and without a clear-cut socio-demographic 
and behavioral profile. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next 
section describes the databases used and the construction of the behavioral variables 
used in the paper. The third section traces the socio-demographic profile of investors 
in warrants and studies the importance of overconfidence, disposition and gambling 
as determinants of the decision to participate in the market for warrants. In section 4 
the trading activity in stocks and warrants is studied. Section 5 analyses the trading 
frequency and investors are split according to their intensity of trading in warrants. In 
the last section I draw some final conclusions. 
 




The main database used in this study (the trading database) contains information 
from one of the top three Portuguese banks, with a market share of 15% to 20%. The 
information relates to all the existing accounts of individual (ie, retail) investors and 
includes the demographic data (marital status, birth date, gender, education, 
8 
 
occupation and residence) of the first account holder. In addition, it includes 
information on all transactions in financial instruments linked to these accounts for the 
period 02/01/1997 to 16/09/2006. This information includes the date of the transaction, 
the transaction type (purchase or sale), the ISIN code of the financial instrument, the 
quantity traded and at what price. 
In the period of almost ten years covered by this database, 3,620 investors traded 
warrants and 491,540 traded stocks. This means that for every 136 equity investors 
only one traded warrants, which is to say that the market of this derivative instrument 
is composed of a small percentage of the Portuguese population. It is difficult to 
establish a comparison with other countries and jurisdictions, because this kind of 
information is not easily available. Nevertheless, it is possible to compare this 
percentage with the one in Hong-Kong: according to SFC (2006), 12.6% of individual 
investors in Hong-Kong had made transactions in warrants, which is a percentage far 
higher than the Portuguese one. This may reflect the programs of privatization carried 
out by successive governments that led many Portuguese families to invest in the 
stock of firms being privatized during this period, as well as the greater complexity of 
warrants (in comparison with stocks) that discourages the investment in this financial 
instrument. It is also the result of the late introduction of this derivative instrument in 
Portugal. In fact, detachable warrants came into Portuguese legislation in 1988 
(Decree-Law No. 229-B/88 of July 4): bonds may have detachable warrants, and the 
bondholder has a warrant that confers on him the right to acquire shares at a price 
under predetermined conditions. This warrant is detached from the bond and can be 
freely traded on the stock market regardless of the bond it was detached from. 
Subsequently, Decree-Law No. 172/99 of May 20 was approved, which was followed 
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by Regulation No. 19/99 of the CMVM (the Portuguese Securities Supervisor), dated 
November 10th, both of which established the legal framework of covered warrants. 
The first issue of detachable warrants in Portugal was led by the Banco Comercial de 
Macau, in 1990, and the first issue of covered warrants was led by Banco Santander 
in September 2000 (Mendes 2012). 
Thus, it is not surprising that in the period covered by the database the total number 
of trades in stocks (more than 3.8 million) is much greater than the total number of 
trades in warrants (slightly above 0.2 million), or that the average number of trades in 
warrants (stocks) per investor is 58.3 (7.8).4 Indeed, many investors had their first 
contact with the stock market following the privatization of state-owned firms, but 
acquired the shares in a purely buy-and-hold strategy or sold them later without having 
invested in new stocks. On the contrary, the greater complexity of warrants may have 
led some investors to specialize in this derivative instrument and, consequently, to be 
much more active, buying and selling on market expectations that they have regarding 
the future prices of the underlying assets.  
However, the sample used in the following sections is restricted to less investors. 
Firstly, only investors who trade in stocks are selected from the database, and I 
exclude investors living abroad. I also exclude what I name ‘curious investors’, that is, 
investors who have only traded once in either stocks or warrants. Some of these 
investors in stocks also invest and trade in warrants, and after the exclusion of some 
observations for which there is not sufficient information, I end up with a sample of 
52,768 investors in stocks, off which 1,705 also trade warrants during the period 
                                                          
4 In the database used by Schmitz et al. (2007) the average investor made 55 transactions in warrants. However, 
the time period covered is only 51 months, shorter than the one used here. 
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covered by the dataset. The activity of investors in warrants is illustrated in this smaller 
sample by the total number of trades in stocks (743,340) which is more than 7 times 
higher than the total number of trades in warrants (102,314); the average number of 
trades per investor is 79.0 trades in warrants and only 13.6 trades in stocks (the 
maximum is 3,374 and 2,232 trades in warrants and stocks, respectively).  
A different database is also used. It comes from a survey conducted by CMVM 
to identify the characteristics of Portuguese individual investors.5 The most recent one 
was conducted in 2000, and was publicly released in May 2005 on the CMVM website. 
More than fifteen thousand individuals were contacted between 2 October and 22 
December 2000 using the direct interview technique. These individuals were 
responsible or co-responsible for the investment decisions within the family. All the 
identified investors in securities (1,559) were interviewed using a structured 
questionnaire. Each questionnaire included socio-demographic questions, questions 
related to the nature and type of the assets held and investor experience, but there 
are no questions related to the size of the portfolio, nor the amounts invested in each 
type of asset. There are also questions related to investor’s trading behavior 
(frequency of transactions, sources of information used, etc.) and to investor’s 
knowledge about markets and market players. This database is used to compute 
proxies for the better than average and the gambling attitude towards the investment 
in derivatives variables.  
 
                                                          
5 The survey identifies an investor in securities as one holding one or more of the following assets: stocks, bonds, 
mutual funds, participation certificates and derivatives. 
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2.2. Behavioral variables 
 
 
Two approaches are used to deal with the overconfidence issue. Firstly, the 
approach of Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) and Bailey et al. (2008) is followed, and 
an investor is considered overconfident if his trading activity is in the top quartile of the 
distribution on investors’ trading activity (i.e., are in the upper quartile of the number 
of trades in stocks) and his performance is in the bottom quartile of the distribution of 
investors’ stock returns. This definition is based on the idea that overconfident 
investors trade too much and consequently get lower returns for their investments 
(Odean 1999, Barber and Odean 2000). The variable so defined is labeled 
OVERCONFIDENCE.  
Alternatively, I also use the better than average concept. Overconfident investors 
are defined as those who believe that they know more than they actually do, this being 
measured by the difference, if positive, between self-reported financial knowledge and 
actual financial knowledge. The self-reported financial knowledge variable is based on 
the survey question: “How do you rate, on a 1 (very low) to 7 (very high) scale, your 
own knowledge of financial assets and markets?”. Investors’ answers to this question 
are compared with an actual knowledge variable measured in the 1 to 7 scale, which 
comes out of the survey as well.  
Three of the survey questions (questions 7, 11 combined with 11A, and 13) are 
used to compute investors’ actual knowledge. In the survey, investors are asked to 
name companies with shares or bonds listed, up to a maximum number of 5 (question 
7). Responses to this answer are marked from 0 to 5, 0 meaning that investor fails to 
mention the name of any company, and 5 that he correctly named 5 companies with 
shares or bonds listed. In question 11A (and in question 11) investors are asked 
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whether they know any of the following entities: BVLP, Interbolsa, CMVM, Credit 
Institutions, Dealers. Again, answers are marked from 0 to 5, with 0 meaning that 
investors are unaware of these entities and 5 that they know them all. Finally, question 
13 is the following: “If you wish to file a complaint about a financial intermediary, an 
issuer or any other entity related with the securities markets, to whom would you 
address it?” Answers are marked with 5 if CMVM is mentioned and with 0 if no entity 
(or a wrong one) is identified. The unweighted average of the answers obtained to 
these three questions, converted to the 1 to 7 scale, is used as a proxy for the actual 
knowledge of individual investors, higher values meaning that investors have a better 
understanding of financial markets. 
If the difference between the self-reported and the actual knowledge is positive 
and greater than 0.9 then BETTER THAN AVERAGE = 1.6 I then regress this better 
than average variable on a set of socio-demographic investor characteristics, using 
the investors’ characteristics from the CMVM survey. In a second step, the estimated 
coefficients of this linear probability model (LPM) are used to predict whether investors 
in the trading database are (are not) better than average. I now use the socio-
demographic investor characteristics from the trading database and the estimated 
LPM coefficients to estimate whether investors are better than average, again using 
an LPM model. Assuming that the percentage of investors with this bias in the trading 
database is equal to the percentage of better than average investors in the survey, 
BETTER THAN AVERAGE = 1 for the investors with the higher score in the model 
estimated in the second step of the procedure.  
                                                          
6 Different limits were used and the results are robust. 
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To access the hedonic motive for investment I construct the GAMBLING variable, 
with a procedure similar to that of the better than average variable. Investors are 
considered to have a gambling attitude towards the investment in financial markets 
when they do not get any information regarding financial markets and products and 
yet they trade financial instruments, whichever they are. From the CMVM’s survey the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the investors who do not use any source of 
information to get informed on financial markets and products are analyzed, and I 
assume that these investors do have a gambling attitude because they invest and 
trade in financial instruments without getting any information on financial markets and 
products. Firstly, this gambling variable is regressed on a set of socio-demographic 
characteristics of investors, using the investor’s characteristics from the survey. In a 
second step, the estimated coefficients of this model are used to predict which 
investors in the transactions database have a gambling attitude. Assuming that the 
percentages of investors with a gambling attitude are similar in the survey and in the 
main trading database, GAMBLING = 1 for the investors with the higher scores in the 
estimated gambling LPM model from the second step. 
As regards the DISPOSITION proxy, I follow the Goetzmann and Massa (2003) 
methodology. Firstly, each transaction in stocks is classified as “trade at loss” or “trade 
at gain”.7 Then, for each stock in the portfolio, a time series of the trades (sales and 
buys) at loss and trades at gain is constructed. For example, when a sale happens, I 
compute the difference between the sell price and the price at which the previous 
purchase of that stock occurred. Negative differences (sale price lower than the buy 
price) are recorded as sale at loss, and positive differences as sale at gain. Buys are 
                                                          
7 I assume a LIFO criterion (the last shares bought are the first ones to be sold) to identify sales at loss.  
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treated in a similar fashion; in these cases the price that occurred in the previous trade 
of the same stock (regardless of it being a sale or a purchase) is used as the reference 
price. Given that disposition investors tend to sell winning stocks (that is, sell at gain) 
and buy losing stocks (that is, buy at loss), for each stock I compute the ratio between 
buys at loss plus sells at gain minus sells at loss minus buys at gain, standardized by 
the sum of buy at loss, buy at gain, sell at loss and sell at gain. Adding up for all stocks 
in the portfolio, if this ratio is positive, then the investor exhibits disposition effect, and 
if not positive the investor dos not exhibit disposition effect. Thus, DISPOSITION = 1 
if that ratio is positive, and zero otherwise. 
 
3. The participation decision 
 
 
I use a probit model to distinguish the characteristics of investors who traded in 
both warrants and stocks from those who only traded stocks (that is, the decision to 
participate in the market for warrants). The base probit model is the following: 
Warrant = f (Male, Age, Married, Education, Job, Place of Residence) 
where8: 
 Warrant is a binary variable, equal to 1 if the investor trades in warrants during 
the period, and zero otherwise (that is, the investor trades in stocks but not in 
warrants);  
                                                          
8 I do not include wealth or income variables because the database does not have any information directly linked 




 Male is a gender variable, equal to 1 if the investor is male;  
 Age is the age of the investor in years, defined as (2006 minus the year of birth 
of the account holder);  
 Married is the marital status of the investor, and is equal to 1 if he/she is married; 
 Education is the level of education. Three categories are considered: Low = 1, 
if the investor has 4 or less years of education; Average = 1, if the investor has 
more than 4 but 12 or less years of education; High = 1, if a technical or higher 
course was completed by the investor; 
 Job represents the occupation of the investor. Five categories are considered: 
Highly skilled = 1, if the investor is a business manager, director or is in the 
upper levels of public administration; Skilled = 1, if the investor is an office work 
or similar; Low skill = 1, if farmer, industrial worker, mechanic or non-qualified 
worker; Independent workers = 1, if the investor is a liberal professional (that 
is, works but does not have a tenured position in a company); and Inactive = 1, 
if the investor is retired, unemployed or student; 
 Place of Residence represents the region of residence of the investor. Three 
categories are considered: Lisbon = 1 if the investor lives in Lisbon; Porto = 1 
if living in Porto; Other = 1 if the investor does not live in Lisbon or in Porto.9  
The literature considers that more risk-tolerant behavior is associated with 
younger investors who do not have family responsibilities within marriage, and that 
more qualified professions are generally associated with a higher income level and 
                                                          
9 Four or less years of education, inactive workers (mostly retired), and residence outside Lisbon and Porto are 
the omitted categories in all the regressions. 
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thus permit taking higher risks. In fact, it has been shown that investors’ behavior 
depends on socio-demographic characteristics: age (DaSilva and Giannikos 2006), 
occupation (Christiansen et al. 2008) or the environment in which they live 
(Goetzmann and Kumar 2008). Barber and Odean (2001) and Goetzmann and Kumar 
(2008), for example, report evidence that married investors, women and older 
investors have less appetite for risk. On the other hand, higher levels of education 
have been positively associated with greater sophistication. Related to this literature, 
recent works on financial literacy show that the higher the individual knowledge, the 
more efficient and rational will be her/his financial behavior, such as planning and 
saving for retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell 2009), investing in the stock market 
(Christelis et al. 2010) or diversifying portfolio (Abreu and Mendes 2010). 
Calvet et al. (2009) concludes that seemingly irrational behavior diminishes 
substantially with investor wealth. I attempt to control for investors’ wealth by 
controlling for their job (the closest proxy for wealth insofar as neither the survey nor 
the trading database have an income or wealth variable). To that end, dummy 
variables are used to identify inactive investors, INACTIVE, investors with a highly 
skilled job, HIGHLY SKILLED, those with a skilled job, SKILLED, those with low skilled 
jobs, LOW SKILL, and investors who are professional liberals, INDEPENDENT 
WORKERS. Investor’s residence is also controlled for since investors who live in the 
metropolitan areas are usually more educated, are more likely to be wealthier and 
employed in the financial sector and consequently to have access to better quality 
information. Thus, I distinguish investors who reside in Lisbon, LISBON, from those 
who reside in Porto, PORTO, which are the two largest Portuguese cities, from 




Table 1: The Participation Decision (Probit Model) 
 [1]     [2]     [3]  
Male 0.256 ***  0.089 **  0.083 * 
 8.80   2.12   1.95  
Age -0.013 ***  -0.020 ***  -0.020 *** 
 -3.05   -4.34   -4.35  
Age squared 0.0000   0.0001 ***  0.0001 *** 
 1.18   2.80   2.76  
Married -0.008   0.071 *  0.072 ** 
 -0.29   1.93   1.97  
High education -0.125 **  -0.066   -0.078  
 -2.37   -1.09   -1.28  
Intermediate educ. -0.105 ***  -0.074 **  -0.067 * 
 -3.43   -2.04   -1.84  
Highly skilled -0.112 ***  -0.106 *  -0.108 ** 
 -2.87   -1.93   -1.96  
Skilled -0.344 ***  -0.341 ***  -0.345 *** 
 -5.82   -5.12   -5.18  
Low skill 0.044   -0.017   -0.029  
 1.09   -0.37   -0.61  
Independent workers -0.043   -0.078   -0.099 * 
 -1.13   -1.46   -1.79  
Lisbon 0.020   0.050   0.032  
 0.83   1.41   0.87  
Porto -0.006   0.094   0.085  
 -0.17   1.57   1.43  
Overconfidence    0.109 ***    
    2.58     
Better than average       -0.049  
       -1.27  
Disposition    0.528 ***  0.531 *** 
    16.84   17.01  
Gambling  
  0.084 *  0.077 * 
    1.75   1.64  
Low return    0.050   0.095 *** 
    1.49   3.46  
Nº obs with Y=1 1702     1702     1702   
Nº observations 52767     52767     52767   
LR stat. 313   1677   1672  
Prob. 0.00     0.00     0.00   
Obs: (i) z-stats in italics; (ii) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance   
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively; (iii) the models include a constant as well.  
 
The probit model is estimated by maximum likelihood, and the results are in Table 
1. The results of the base model (column [1]) confirm that investors in warrants and 
investors in stocks do have different socio-demographic characteristics. In fact, 
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younger and less educated men are more likely to invest in warrants, and investors 
with higher skilled jobs are more likely to invest only in stocks. As regards residence, 
living in the largest cities does not allow any discrimination between investors in stocks 
and in warrants. Marital status is not a distinguishing factor as well. 
In columns [2] and [3] of Table 1 I introduce the behavioral characteristics of 
investors (overconfidence, better than average, disposition and gambling). 
Overconfidence can lead investors to trade financial instruments in which they are not 
accurately familiar with. Overconfident investors have been associated with excessive 
risk taking (Dorn and Huberman 2005; Nosic and Weber 2010), and this means that 
they are more prone to take on risk for which there is no apparent reward. Also, 
overconfident investors tend to think they are above average regarding their 
investment skills (Taylor and Brown 1988) and consequently may invest more in 
complex financial instruments. I find that the better than average effect does not have 
a strong impact on the participation decision, but overconfident investors are more 
prone to invest in warrants.  
The disposition effect, defined as the tendency to sell winning stocks too early while 
riding losing stocks too long, has also been considered to have an impact on the 
trading behavior of individual investors, and is a case of reference point dependent 
behavior since investors behave differently when they are in the gain zone than when 
they are in the loss zone. The disposition effect has been found in retail as well as in 
professional investors, and it has been found in stock (Odean 1998b, Grinblatt and 
Keloharju 2001, Dhar and Zhu 2002, for example) and in mutual fund investors (Bailey 
et al. 2011). I consider that disposition-prone investors may also adjust their behavior 
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as regards the investment in warrants, a complex financial instrument.10 Thus, if an 
investor exhibits disposition effect in his/her stock trading activity then this behavioral 
bias may also have an impact on the decision to participate in the market for warrants. 
The DISPOSITION variable is the proxy I use; it is a binary variable, equal to one if 
the investor exhibits disposition behavior in the stock trading activity, and zero 
otherwise. 
Similarly, recent research postulates that some investors view trading in the stock 
market as an opportunity to gamble. Barber et al. (2009), for example, document that, 
in Taiwan, the introduction of the government-sponsored lottery did significantly reduce 
the stock market turnover, and the authors conclude that part of the excessive trading 
of individual investors is motivated by their gambling desire. It has also been argued 
that gambling may justify investors’ irrationality when they opt for derivative products. 
In fact, retail investors may decide not to be informed about product complexity and 
thus choose randomly with the help of commission-based incentivized distributors, 
which provides a rationale for product overpricing (Bernard et al. 2010). Campbell 
(2006), on the other hand, argues that either investors make random decisions or 
product distributors are very successful in marketing and selling. Nicolaus (2010) finds 
a pattern of observations that is likely to be driven by speculative purposes. One way 
to account for the investors’ gambling desire is to consider that investors who do not 
use any source of information at all (i.e., they are not informed about financial markets 
and instruments) are gamblers and make random decisions. The GAMBLING variable 
is the proxy used; it is a binary variable, equal to one if the investor does not use any 
source to get information about financial markets and instruments. 
                                                          
10 Ofir and Wiener (2012) conclude that structured retail products are designed to capture investor biased 
behavior such as the disposition effect.  
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The hypothesis that the investor’s performance in the stock market influences 
the investment in warrants is also tested. Mendes (2012) argues that investors with 
low success in the investment in stocks are more likely to invest in more leveraged 
products (that is, warrants) in an attempt to recover losses suffered. Thus, a binary 
variable is defined for the lower quartile of performance of equity investments. 
However, information on the composition of the portfolio of each investor is not 
available, and the methodology of Seru et al. (2010) (also used in Mendes 2012, and 
Abreu et al. 2011) is followed. Therefore, the performance of investors is measured by 
the 30-day unweighted average return of the stocks purchased by the investor. 
Accordingly, the variable LOW RETURN is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
investor’s return on the investment in stocks is in the lowest quartile of returns.11 
I conclude that overconfident investors are indeed more likely to invest in 
warrants, but the better than average effect does not have a significant impact. This is 
consistent with Coval and Shumway (2005) findings on future traders. Overly wedded 
to prior beliefs, an overconfident investor may discount negative public information that 
pushes down prices, thus holding on and taking on excessive risk.  
As regards the impact of disposition, its effect is quite strong and I conclude 
that investors who exhibit disposition effect in their stock trading activity are more likely 
to invest and trade in warrants. This result is in line with the findings of Ofir and Wiener 
(2012); using an experiment, the authors find evidence of the prevalence of the 
disposition effect on investors’ decision-making regarding structured retail products.  
                                                          
11 Related to this literature, Merkle and Weber (2014) claim that expectations are relevant to explain changes in 
the risky portfolio of individual investors. Nevertheless, I do not have information on investors’ expectations and 
cannot include this into the analysis. 
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Regarding the possibility that some individuals may participate in the stock (and 
derivatives) market because of their risk-loving attitude, albeit not very strong from a 
statistical standpoint, the gambling attitude seems to lead more investors to participate 
in the warrants market, and this is evidence of a behavioral bias in the market for this 
complex financial instrument. 
One should also notice the high statistical significance on the LOW RETURN 
variable in the model with the better than average effect, and its lack of statistical 
significance (although with a positive coefficient) in the model with the 
OVERCONFIDENCE variable. This could be the result of its correlation with the latter 
variable.12 Nevertheless, one can conclude that there is evidence that investors with 
low success from the investment in stocks are more likely to invest in warrants. This 
suggests that the investment in warrants (and similarly the investment in other 
derivative instruments) may be an attempt to compensate for the losses investors incur 
when investing in stocks. 
 
  
                                                          
12 The OVERCONFIDENCE variable combines lower returns with higher trading activity. 
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4. Trading activity 
 
 
The decision to participate in the warrants market is one of the decisions an 
investor makes. Conditioned to this decision, in a second step the investor decides on 
whether to trade more or to trade less. In Portugal, both the stock market and the 
warrants market can be considered liquid markets. One may recall that warrants are 
a financial instrument with a large success in Portugal, and investors traded warrants 
very actively (Mendes 2012). Thus, liquidity does not seem to be a clear distinguishing 
factor of the stock and the warrants markets.  
In this section I study whether investors trade stocks differently than warrants. For 
this purpose, the number of trades each investor makes in either stocks or warrants is 
used. I am interested in the impact of behavioral biases on the trading activity of 
individual investors in both types of financial instruments. 
Thus, the model’s dependent variable is the number of trades in warrants (or 
stocks) an investor makes during the sample period. This is a count model, in which 
the independent variables are those from the previous section. I use a negative 
binomial count model, estimated by maximum likelihood. Results are in Table 2, and 
both proxies for overconfidence are tested. 
A quick look at the results reported in Table 2 (models [6] and [7]) allows one 
to conclude that warrants trading is influenced by investors’ socio-demographic 
characteristics and behavioral traits. In fact, education, occupation and age do not 
have a linear impact on the number of trades: investors with an intermediate academic 
degree trade more warrants, investors with highly qualified occupations have a trading 
activity similar to that of inactive investors, and in both cases they trade more than 
skilled, low skilled and independent workers. Also, investors living in Lisbon trade 
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warrants more often. Nevertheless, gender and marital status are not relevant to 
explain the number of trades in warrants these investors make.  
Regarding the behavioral determinants of trading, results show that 
overconfidence has a positive impact on trading, this variable being significant at the 
10% level, but the better than average proxy is not. Therefore, there is slight evidence 
that overconfident investors do trade more often. The disposition proxy is significant 
(at the 5% level), as it is for the stock trading case (models [4] and [5]). Nevertheless, 
this coefficient is smaller in models [6] and [7], which means that the impact of the 
disposition effect is lower when investors trade warrants than when they trade stocks. 
However, the most interesting finding is related to the sign of the gambling coefficient: 
it is positive (negative) for the warrants (stocks) case, meaning that the gambling 
motivated trading is more pronounced in the trading of these derivative instruments. 
Moreover, the coefficient of the gambling variable is higher than the coefficients of the 
other behavioral variables. This clearly distinguishes the warrants from the stock 
market activity, meaning that the search for pleasure in trading increases warrants 
transactions but instead it decreases the stock trading activity. In other words, when 
investors are driven for pleasure to trade in financial markets they tend to trade 
complex products more and to trade simpler and easier to understand financial 
instruments less.    
Finally, although the participation in the warrants market is driven by the 
existence of lower returns obtained in the investment in stocks, the number of trades 





Table 2: Trading activity – Count model 
 
Trades in 
Stocks     
Trades in 
Stocks     
Trades in 
Warrants     
Trades in 
Warrants   
 [4]     [5]     [6]     [7]   
Male 0.351 *** 0.346 ***   -0.101   -0.063  
 30.00   29.98    -0.63   -0.39  
Age 0.027 *** 0.026 ***   0.143 ***  0.145 *** 
 14.27   14.00    7.67   7.75  
Age squared -0.0002 *** -0.0002 ***   -0.0015 ***  -0.0014 *** 
 -11.35   -11.19    -7.86   -7.82  
Married 0.022 **  0.023 **   0.072   0.023  
 2.07   2.15    0.53   0.17  
High education -0.176 *** -0.181 ***   -0.121   -0.040  
 -8.64   -9.08    -0.52   -0.17  
Intermediate educ. -0.134 *** -0.128 ***   0.255 **  0.227 * 
 -10.22   -9.97    2.04   1.82  
Highly skilled 0.025 *  0.030 *   -0.182   -0.101  
 1.65   1.95    -0.94   -0.53  
Skilled -0.263 *** -0.258 ***   -0.976 ***  -0.910 *** 
 -12.50   -12.26    -3.97   -3.69  
Low skill -0.110 *** -0.112 ***   -0.787 *** -0.717 *** 
 -6.25   -6.45    -4.71   -4.31  
Independent workers 0.015   0.001    -0.761 ***  -0.592 *** 
 0.88   0.09    -3.88   -3.14  
Lisbon 0.033 *** 0.013    0.324 **  0.429 *** 
 2.70   1.19    2.34   3.39  
Porto 0.082 *** 0.054 ***   0.109   0.140  
 5.51   3.91    0.47   0.61  
Overconfidence    0.231 ***      0.246 * 
    12.72       1.78  
Better than average 0.044 ***     -0.304     
 3.01       -1.21     
Disposition 0.931 *** 0.935 ***   0.318 **  0.331 ** 
 78.73   79.10    2.40   2.50  
Gambling -0.068 *** -0.081 ***   0.340 **  0.391 ** 
 -3.42   -4.05    2.05   2.38  
Low return -0.191 *** -0.261 ***   0.024   -0.090  
  -17.34     -21.34     0.24   -0.81  
Nº observations 52767   52767    1702     1702   
LR stat. 1666999   1667157    332031   332029  
Prob. 0.00     0.00     0.00     0.00  
Obs: (i) z-stats in italics; (ii) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively;  





In what regards the stock market, models [4] and [5] allow one to conclude that 
there are differences in the socio-demographic determinants of the stock and of the 
warrants trading activity. Less educated, highly skilled men trade stocks more 
frequently, and the effect of age is non-linear. Marital status does seem to play a role, 
and as for the place of residence, investors from Lisbon and Porto seem to trade more 
in stocks than other investors. This set of results differs from those reported by Abreu 
and Mendes (2012). In fact, using a survey of the Portuguese population (not actual 
transactions data), Abreu and Mendes (2012) conclude that gender, education and 
occupation were not distinctive factors of the trading activity of Portuguese investors.  
As for overconfidence and the better than average effect, both proxies are highly 
significant and with a positive sign, meaning that overconfident investors trade stocks 
more often and that those who feel they are better than average also trade stocks 
more often. This result is in line with the findings of Odean (1998b), Barber and Odean 
(2001), Glaser and Weber (2007), Deaves et al. (2009), and Graham et al. (2009), 
among others. 
Disposition-prone investors also trade stocks more often. One characteristic of 
investors who have this behavioral bias is that they hold on too long to the stocks in 
the portfolio in down markets, and sell them too soon in up markets, thus not taking 
full advantage of the existing opportunities in the market. The sample period includes 
two bull market sub-periods (1997/2000 and 2002/2006) and one bear market sub-
period (2000/2002), and thus disposition-motivated trading could be more intense by 
these investors not only because there is only one down sub-period but also because 
the bull market sub-periods are lengthier than the bear sub-period.  
Gambling and low returns lead to lower stock trading activity: the coefficients of both 
variables are statistically significant and negative, meaning that gamblers trade stocks 
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less often and that lower returns on the investment in stocks also leads investors to 
be less active in the stock market. 
 
5. Trading frequency 
 
 
The number of trades was the dependent variable in the previous section, but this 
dependent variable does not account for the period of time in which the investor is 
active in the market. To control for the time span in which investors are active in the 
market I now consider that the investors’ trading activity starts when the investor 
makes the first trade, and assume she is active all the way to the last day of the 
sample. Therefore, it is possible to look at the trading frequency computing the 
average number of warrant trades per year, which is the new dependent variable (in 
logs). The independent variables are all the same as in the previous section, and this 
new model is estimated by OLS.  
Additionally, I search for heterogeneity among investors. Investors with a high 
frequency of trading may have a different profile and motives to trade than investors 
that only trade sporadically. Thereafter, a quantile regression approach is used to 
document if the number of trades in warrants per year responds differently to variations 
in the variables which are expected to affect trading. 
Contrary to least squares regression where all of the inferences pertain only to the 
mean trading frequency, quantile regression techniques allow one to study the impact 
of each covariate along the whole distribution and not just the mean, and thus the 





Table 3 Trading frequency in warrants – Quantile regression 
 
OLS 
    
Quant. 
10     
Quant. 
25     
Quant. 
50     
Quant. 
75     
Quant. 
90   
 
[8]     [9]     [10]     [11]     [12]     [13]   
Male 0.004   -0.001   -0.032   0.012   0.120   0.112  
 0.03   -0.02   -0.26   0.07   0.45   0.39  
Age -0.008   -0.038 ***  -0.060 ***  -0.009   0.011   0.043  
 -0.38   -3.43   -2.95   -0.03   0.29   0.94  
Age squared -0.0002   0.0003 ***  0.0003 *  -0.0003   -0.0005   -0.0007  
 -1.11   2.61   1.67   -0.94   -1.35   -1.52  
Married 0.085   -0.026   0.001   0.301 **  0.059   0.043  
 0.75   -0.35   0.01   1.95   0.27   0.17  
High education 0.245   0.127   0.343   0.366   0.333   0.049  
 0.97   0.77   1.45   1.23   0.61   0.09  
Intermediate educ. 0.156   0.131   0.315 **  0.145   -0.047   0.004  
 1.17   1.31   2.22   0.76   -0.21   0.01  
Highly skilled -0.332 **  -0.097   -0.309 *  -0.602 ***  -0.366   -0.017  
 -2.02   -0.84   -1.92   -2.66   -1.15   -0.05  
Skilled -0.505 *  -0.078   -0.457 *  -0.615 *  -0.267   -0.377  
 -1.84   -0.47   -1.93   -1.72   -0.62   -0.74  
Low skill -0.366 **  0.051   -0.191   -0.407 **  -0.564 *  -0.528  
 -2.14   0.38   -1.07   -1.98   -1.70   -1.48  
Independent workers -0.264   -0.051   -0.253   -0.335   -0.337   -0.324  
 -1.55   -0.41   -1.48   -1.61   -0.97   -0.95  
Lisbon 0.242 *  0.076   0.284 **  0.432 **  0.273   0.177  
 1.81   0.90   2.42   2.56   0.96   0.70  
Porto 0.091   -0.024   0.002   0.232   0.256   -0.261  
 0.57   -0.23   0.01   1.07   0.91   -0.95  
Better than average -0.062   -0.047   -0.078   0.043   -0.064   -0.293  
 -0.39   -0.45   -0.52   0.22   -0.22   -0.78  
Disposition 0.533 ***  0.003   0.251 **  0.893 ***  0.915 ***  0.386  
 3.70   0.04   2.20   5.17   3.19   1.35  
Gambling 0.305 *  0.279 *  0.549 **  0.687 ***  0.283   0.035  
 1.65   1.73   2.29   2.75   0.87   0.10  
Low return 0.105   0.169 **  0.278 ***  0.201   -0.014   -0.203  
  0.93   2.15   2.61   1.41   -0.07   -0.86  
Adj R2 / Quasi-LR stat. 7.56%     52.40     146.70     138.10     72.00     33.10   
F-stat / Prob. 8.7   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.11  
Obs: (i) t-stats in italics; (ii) *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively;         
(iii) the models include a constant as well. 
                
 
Results of the OLS estimation and of the quantile regression model are shown 
in Table 3, where one can confirm the superiority of the quantile regression approach 
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for it allows the discrimination of investors.13 If one is left with the OLS estimates we 
would be (wrongly) assigning all investors the same impact of the independent 
variables, which is not the case. Additionally, the best estimation results (measured by 
the number of coefficients with statistical significance) are those for the quantiles 25 
and 50 of the (log of) annual number of trades in warrants. Investors who trade 
warrants less frequently (quantile 10) as well as those who trade this derivative more 
frequently (quantile 90) are quite heterogeneous, and no clear socio-demographic 
characteristics emerge. Among those with more intensive trading one cannot find any 
distinguishing characteristic: in fact, none of the explanatory variables is significant in 
quantile 90, not even at the 10% significance level. Another very interesting result is 
that, for most of the statistically significant variables, their impact on the (log of) the 
average number of trades in warrants increases with the average number of trades of 
the investor. 
Disposition and gambler’s biases are significant determinants of trading for 
intermediate quantiles. Results show that, when statistically significant, the 
coefficients of the disposition and the gambler variables increase with trading 
frequency, which means that the impact of these behavioral biases is stronger for 
investors who trade warrants more frequently. For the disposition coefficient, investors 
with the 75% higher average number of trades per year do have a highly significant 
0.915 coefficient whilst those with the 25% lowest average number of trades exhibit a 
0.251 coefficient. Thus, up to a certain level of trading intensity, the impact of the 
disposition and gambling biases increases with the intensity of trading.  
 
                                                          
13 The results of the estimation of the models with the OVERCONFIDENCE variable are not presented in order to 




6. Concluding remarks 
 
 
This paper examines the socio-demographic characteristics of retail investors in 
warrants, and discusses the hypothesis that some behavioral biases do have an 
impact on the investors’ predisposition to invest and trade in warrants, a complex 
financial instrument. Amongst the most relevant conclusions of this empirical 
application, one finds that the socio-demographic and behavioral characteristics of 
investors in warrants are different from those of investors in stocks. Firstly, investors 
in warrants have a particular socio-demographic profile: younger and less educated 
men are more likely to invest in warrants. Secondly, investors’ behavioral biases are 
particularly relevant to understand investor’s participation in the market of this complex 
financial instrument. In fact, overconfident and disposition-prone investors as well as 
investors exhibiting a gambling attitude are more likely to invest and trade in warrants.  
Moreover, disposition-prone investors are more likely to trade warrants more 
frequently.  
Secondly, there is a distinguishing characteristic of investors who trade warrants: 
the gambling motive increases warrants transactions but decreases the stock trading 
activity among these investors. In other words, when investors are driven to trade in 
financial markets for pleasure they tend to trade complex products more and to trade 
simple and easier to understand financial instruments less.    
Finally, the quantile analyses show that the disposition and the gambler’s effect are 
the more relevant to explain the frequency of trading the higher the intensity of trading, 
except for high trading frequency investors who seem to be heterogeneous and 
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